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An Institutional Emphasis

LANCE LIEBMA"
Professor Schwartz is an important scholar of the interface between the

difficult moral concept of privacy and the new information technologies.
Someday a book will tell the story of modem history through the lens of
privacy: village lives well known to neighbors; the claims of the national
state (taxes, military service); the social welfare state; and the possibilities
and dangers of modem biology. As Paul Schwartz has written, DNA and
other tools can tell us a great deal about ourselves and can improve our
lives; they can also tell employers, drug companies, prospective in-laws,
and the police things we prefer they not know.
Today's privacy questions will seem like nursery school in a few years.
My students divide fifty-fifty when asked if they would prefer free local
telephone service if each outgoing call were preceded by a fifteen-second
commercial, tailored to their calling patterns (you call for pizza, I for
sushi). The British publisher of Harry Potter books charges two pounds for
a plain-cover copy, which permits an adult to read the book on the London
underground without embarrassment. Living Americans can establish descent from Thomas Jefferson. Amazon can use and sell my book-buying
tastes. The plastic membership card I use to enter the Museum of Modem
Art allows the museum to keep track of my visits.
Contemporary thinking about law is well suited for analysis of these
issues as they arise. Who should have the "right" to the information?
Should we bar sale? What is the appropriate remedy for violation? With
information located in cyberspace, what terrestrial jurisdiction's law should
control? The Schwartz emphasis is on republican values: how do we,
collectively, want to live our lives? It is on the importance of marketguiding structures: what is meaningful consent? what should be the default
rule? And it is on the chicken-and-egg direction of influence as norms are
formed. Especially with rapidly changing technology, we and our friends
are likely to think that what occurs is normal. How can organized society
make itself think about whether evolving expectations create the best pos* William S. Beinecke Professorof Law, Columbia Law School; Directorof h Armrlcan Law
Institute.
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sible world? Asking these questions, Professor Schwartz chooses several
lenses through which to observe incompletenesses and simplifications in
standard rhetoric. Yes, there are arguments for decentralization, for markets, for industry self-regulation, and for contract. But yes also, there is
need for collective public action and seemingly-horrors--even for government.
Professor Schwartz suggests that we change fundamentally the way we
think about privacy before we act either through markets or through government. We now assume that every individual has a right to control her
information and to choose, as an independent actor, whether and how much
information to give and to what extent it can be shared by the donee. Professor Schwartz slowly unravels the threads that form the basis for this
view and offers in its place a model based on fact instead of illusion. Our
idealistic assumption, he argues, ignores the facts that people are unaware
of their rights, that the consent process lacks transparency, and that the
self-regulated are unaccountable. He urges us to stop thinking of privacy
as a right of control and instead to view it as an essential value. That, he
hopes, will lead us toward appropriate new law. This is more than a distinction between viewing the glass as half-empty and seeing it as half-full.
Rather, it is a new metric for evaluating schemes that regulate privacy.
Cautiously, knowing we are entering the legal version of a demilitarized
zone, he demonstrates how a realistic view of the current situation and a
new set of goals can lead to effective government regulation.
Now that I am a professional law-improver, my contribution to this
discussion is to urge attention to the institutions now struggling to adapt
existing public rules (laws) to the opportunities and dangers newly presented by technology.
In the United States, one might think that instant globalized information would give us a period of national law-making. On the contrary, this
has been a quarter-century of state constitutional sovereignty. It has also
been a period of divided government in Washington. The two perhapsrelated circumstances have not made it easy for the national government to
lead. Yet can we imagine that fifty states and one district will separately
make competent law for electronic commerce and the Internet?
The American Law Institute (ALI) and its long-term partner the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL), justly proud of their accomplishments with the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) over six decades, have attempted to be useful.
Meanwhile, after ten years of work in an effort to adapt the UCC's principles for the sale of goods to the new good labeled software, NCCUSL was
satisfied that a draft of adequate quality had been achieved but the ALI was
unconvinced. Therefore, the two organizations agreed to disagree and to
separate this effort from the UCC. Originally designed to be Article 2B of
the UCC, the completed work is now the Uniform Computer Information
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Act (UCITA), recommended by NCCUSL to state legisla1
tures.
Traditionally, the primary task of the ALI has been creation of restatements. Restatements offer general principles describing and explicating
state judge-made law. Like a code in a civil law jurisdiction, a restatement
guides actors through the maze of the common law. If litigation occurs, it
guides litigants and judges. Suggestions have been made that it is now
time for a restatement of the law of privacy. While affected by a variety of
relevant statutes, the field remains substantially judge-made. While federalized in important ways, it remains substantially a matter of state law.
This may well be the time when the ALI's patient, even exhaustive procedures should be focused on a field essentially created by a law review article now almost 120 years old.2
Whether NCCUSL, NCCUSL, and ALI (the UCC), or ALI (restatements) are attempting to influence the development of the law, the effort
deserves and has received scrutiny and criticism. Thoughtful scholars have
raised hard questions about these private law-recommending organizations
and processes.3 Certainly there are risks. Nothing guarantees that all appropriate arguments will be heard, much less that these arguments will
receive their correct weight. Capture can occur.4 NCCUSL's delegates are
selected by governors and thus are responsive to political concerns at the
state level. NCCUSL's procedures give access to those who choose to
participate. Of course moneyed interests will have no difficulty being
heard, while important other interests may not achieve an effective voice.
For better and worse, ALI members come from the elite levels of the practicing bar, the judiciary, and the professoriate. Lawyers and professors can
be too responsive to paying clients. Perhaps equally likely, those with the
interest and the resources to invest time in ALI procedures may reflect, in
their views and their experiences, a limited portion of the spectrum of important substantive concerns. Small efforts have been made to address
1. Compare this to the 12-year effort to revise Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The
American Law Institute gave final approval to a version of the new Article 2 at its annual meeting in
May 1999. In July 1999, the leadership of NCCUSL withdrew that draft from consideration at

NCCUSL's annual meeting. Currently, a new drafting committee, jointly appointed by NCCUSL and
the ALI, is attempting to produce a version that can achieve approval from both private organizations
and (much more impoitantly) wide uniform enactment among the states.
2. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L REv. 193
(1890).
3. See, e.g., Edward J. Janger, Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will Fall: Article 9.
Capture,and the Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L REV. 569 (1998); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott,
The PoliticalEconomy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L REV. 595 (1995); Robert Scott, ThUniformity Norm in Commercial Law: A Comparative Anab,sis of Common Lm ard Code Methodologies, in THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND Co.M1ftERctAL LAW (Jody S.
Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000) (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with author).
4. I sometimes think that capture should be defined as a substantive result with wich one disagrees.

CONNECTICUTLAWREVIEW

[Vol. 32:923

these concerns: funding for participants at NCCUSL meetings and scholarships for ALI members needing help in attending Members Consultative
Group meetings. These gestures hardly answer all the concerns.
But what is the alternative? The great plus about both NCCUSL and
the ALI is patient consideration of difficult legal questions in a public environment where discourse is about public interest and about professional
drafting. Meeting after meeting, draft after draft, preliminary work is exposed to wide attention and criticism. Motions are made to change punctuation. Drafts are improved after careful review by anyone in the world
who is concerned. Arguments about substance must be met on the merits.
Compare, as the common law evolves, a decision by an over-worked
trial judge who has received two briefs from parties concerned with the
result. Can one argue that the statistical chances for good law are weakened by the availability, on the judge's bookshelf or computer, of an ALl
restatement that reflects ten years of work by professors, judges, and lawyers? Or compare a state legislature wrestling-in an environment of interest group pressure and with limited resources to hire talented drafispersons-with how to protect privacy in an age of electronic media. Recommended statutory language, if the result of long and open debate, can only
help. That is even more true if there is a benefit to state legal uniformity
yet no chance that it will be achieved through a federal enactment.
Now turn to the transnational scene. It is obvious that no single geographic jurisdiction can successfully regulate cyberspace. The European
Union and the United States are the behemoths, each with the capacity to
have an elephant's influence on countries with fewer computers.5 But
slowly, gradually, even the United States is learning that it cannot remain
autarchic. The recent withdrawal of the attempt to control (for lawenforcement purposes) encryption technology may stand as a signal moment. Europe, committed to certain definitions of privacy as to nongenetically altered food, will learn similar lessons.
Meanwhile, various multinational institutions have become engaged in
aspects of these questions. It is too soon to know the long-term importance
in privacy matters of United Nations Commission of International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL), International Institute for the Unification of Private
Law (Unidroit), the Hague Convention, the World Trade Organization

5. Professor Schwartz is among a handful of published experts on the details of European/American disputes over privacy protection. See Paul M. Schwartz, European Data Protection
Law andRestrictions on InternationalDataFlows, 80 IOWA L. REV. 471 (1995); Paul M. Schwartz,
Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1607, 1698-1701 (1999);. Professor

Schwarz has also advised the European Union on both American and European privacy law; this work
has led to two co-authored studies. See PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERO, DATA PRIVACY
LAW (1996 & Supp. 1998); JOEL R. REIDENBERO & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, DATA PROTECTION LAW
AND ON-LINE SERVICES: REGULATORY RESPONSES (1998), available in <http://europa.eu.lntlcomm/
dg15/en/media/dataprot/:studies/regul.htmn>.
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(WTO), and World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). What
seems clear is the tremendous risk that incomplete national assumptions
will be powerful, that multinational media giants will assert themselves,
and that imperfect enforcement schemes will allow loopholes and cheating.
The subject of privacy has the potential to be an area in which world government creeps forward. But this can only happen if, among the various
law-considering organizations, one or more forums are found that are patient, serious, and therefore credible. It is, after all, a new millennium, and
just perhaps the United States, so resistant to risks of compromised sovereignty, will for a change play a positive role.
Imagining institutions, within the United States and multinationally,
one must then hope that the individuals who are part of those entities will
base their work on the vision of privacy sketched by Paul Schwartz or on
another equally serious and realistic.

